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California Breaks New Ground in the
Fight Against Elder Abuse But Fails
to Build an Effective Foundation
by
KYMBERLEIGH N. KoRPUs*
"The breakdown of the family challenges the very foundations of
American inheritance law....
On December 2, 1988, firemen responded to a call for emergency
assistance and entered the home Dolores McKelvey shared with her
grown children, Thomas and Theresa.2 The firemen discovered
Dolores, a multiple sclerosis victim, who was paralyzed and unable
even to use a wheelchair,
[i]n a hospital bed lying in excrement from her ankles to her
shoulders. Maggots, ants and other insects crawled upon her. She
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A. Political Science,
University of California at Berkeley, 1997. I would like to dedicate this note to my
grandmother, Rebecca, whose gracious, loving, and persevering manner while facing her
own health and personal challenges has been the inspiration for my thoughts and the fuel
when my fire ran low during this endeavor. I would also like to thank Professor Gail Bird
of Hastings College of the Law for the topic idea and providing valuable feedback and
encouragement, Elisabeth Traugott for her patience, insight, and wonderful editing
assistance, and my husband, Todd, for the gift of his unwavering support and love.
1. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese
Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 77,79 (1998).
2. People v. McKelvey H, 230 Cal. App. 3d 399,401 (1991).
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had sores on her legs and complained of the insect bites. Her skin
flaked when [a fireman] brushed the insects away.3
Dolores also suffered from pressure sores, dehydration, malnutrition,
bone fractures of the femur, pelvis and ribs due to osteoporosis, skin
burns from urine and excrement, and urinary, kidney, and leg
infections.4 She died four days later from heart failure caused by
multiple sclerosis, malnutrition, infections, and neglect.5
On December 3, 1990, sixty-seven-year-old Robert Heitzman
was found dead in the home that he shared with two grown sons,
Jerry and Richard, and Richard's three sons.6 The condition of
Robert's body, partially paralyzed from a series of strokes in 1970,
was shocking: bed sores covered one-sixth of his body. Later, after
an autopsy, his death would be attributed to septic shock resulting
from the bed sores that had probably been caused by malnutrition,
dehydration, and neglect.
7
His body lay on a mattress that was rotted through from constant
wetness, exposing the metal springs. The stench of urine and feces
filled not only decedent's bedroom, but the entire house as well.
His bathroom was filthy, and the bathtub contained fetid, green-
colored water that appeared to have been there for some time....
[In response to questioning,] Jerry admitted that he had withheld
all food and liquids from his father for the three days preceding his
death on December 3. Jerry explained that he was expecting
company for dinner on Sunday, December 2, and did not want his
father, who no longer had control over his bowels and bladder, to
defecate or urinate because it would further cause the house to
smell.
8
3. Id. at 401-02. Theresa claimed to have been taking care of her mother's personal
hygiene until a mere four days before the firemen had been summoned, but said that she
had finally been overwhelmed by the responsibility and had left the home after telling her
mother that she couldn't deal with the situation any longer. Id. at 402. Thomas later told
the court that Dolores had not permitted him to attend to her personal hygiene because it
embarrassed them both, but that she was alert, in charge of the household, had access to a
phone, and that she could both change her own diapers and gain access to more of them.
Id. The court found that the deplorable condition in which Dolores was found belied
Thomas's claims about her ability to take care of herself.
4. See id. at 402, 405.
5. Id. at 402. At trial, Thomas McKelvey was convicted of neglect of a dependent
adult and sentenced to three years in prison. Id.
6. People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Cal. 1994).
7. Id. at 1232.
8. Id. at 1231-32. Jerry and Richard were convicted under California Penal Code
section 368 for causing physical pain or mental suffering to an elder or dependent adult in
their care. Id. at 1245.
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On January 7, 1998, Desiree Lu Balestra arrived at the home she
shared with her sixty-nine-year-old mother, Dolores Holden.9 An
argument between them that had begun earlier over the phone flared
up again, and culminated a while later. Just after 10 p.m. that night
Desiree went into Dolores's room, shut the door, and told her that
she wouldn't be leaving. Desiree told her mother that she had never
liked her, bragged that she had assaulted others before her, and then
informed her that
[t]his [was] bye-bye... [that Dolores wouldn't] be here
tomorrow... [and that Desiree was] going to have some fun with
[her]."'1 Balestra then beat and otherwise terrorized her mother
for the next two hours, pushing Dolores's head into her chest,
pulling her hair, beating her on the arms, shoulder, back and legs,
and tearing up personal letters and other sentimental objects that
belonged to Dolores, while professing her hatred of her mother.
1
Luckily, Dolores finally managed to knock Desiree to the floor and
escape from the home. Dolores escaped with her life, but not before
she suffered injuries requiring over $8,000 in orthodontia work,
among others.
2
This case dealt primarily with the liability of one of Robert's other children, Susan
Heitzman, for her failure to act to help her father. See id. at 1232. Susan moved away
from the home a year before her father's death, but had visited frequently, especially
during the last two months of his life. She was aware of the increasingly filthy condition of
the home, that her father needed medical care, and that a social worker had unsuccessfully
encouraged Jerry to take Robert to a doctor. In fact, Susan was in her father's bedroom
five weeks before he died and saw the hole in the mattress and the fecal matter on the
floor. She also stayed at the home for an entire weekend two weeks before her father's
death and watched him sitting, weak and disoriented, in the living room. Susan again
stayed at the house for several days during the following week, Thanksgiving week, but
claimed that her father's door remained closed and that she never saw him during her visit.
Susan left the house the morning that her father died. See idU at 1232.
Despite the fact that Susan Heitzman knew about the deplorable conditions in which
her father was living, that his health and medical needs were not being met, and that he
was suffering tremendously, she never took any action to help her father. She was
acquitted of any liability in his death because the court found that "the People presented
no evidence tending to show that [Susan] had a legal duty to control the conduct of either
of her brothers." Id. at 1245.
9. People v. Balestra, 76 Cal. App. 4th 57, 61 (1999).
10. See id
11. Mtt
12. Id at 61-62. After Balestra was convicted of elder abuse, she was ordered to pay
$7,198 in restitution to her mother at the rate of $75 per month. Id. at 62.
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Introduction
Approximately 2.3 million elderly Americans will be abused 13
this year,14 and 90% of the abusers will be family members. 5 Two-
13. For the purposes of this Note, and in accordance with the latest research on elder
abuse, the term "abuse" refers to any of the following: physical abuse, sexual abuse,
emotional or psychological abuse, financial or material exploitation, abandonment, or
neglect.
Physical abuse is defined as: "the use of physical force that may result in bodily
injury, physical pain, or impairment. Physical punishments of any kind [are] examples of
physical abuse." THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASSOCIATION & WESTAT,
INC., THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, The National Elder Abuse Incidence
Study: Final Report 11 (1998), available at http://www.aoa.gov/abuse/report/default.htm
[hereinafter Elder Abuse Incidence Study].
Sexual abuse is defined as "non-consensual sexual contact of any kind with an elderly
person" or sexual contact with someone that is incapable of giving consent. Id. at 11, 3-3.
Emotional and psychological abuse is "defined as the infliction of anguish, pain or
distress." Id. at 11. The following is a non-exhaustive list of emotional or physical abuse:
"verbal assaults, insults, threats, intimidation, humiliation,.., harassment.... treating an
older person like an infant.... isolating an elderly person from family, friends, or regular
activities .... giving an older person a 'silent treatment,' and enforc[ing] social isolation."
Id. at 3-3.
Financial or material exploitation is "the illegal or improper use of an elder's funds,
property, or assets." Id. at 12.
Abandonment is defined as desertion by an individual with physical custody of an
elder or desertion by an individual who had previously assumed responsibility for
providing care for an elder. Id.
Neglect is "the refusal or failure to fulfill any part of a person's obligations or duties
to an elder." Id. Typically neglect is the refusal or failure to provide essentials such as
"food, water, clothing, shelter, personal hygiene, medicine, comfort, [and] personal
safety." Id. at 3-3.
14. See STATISTICAL INFORMATION STAFF, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Projections of
the Resident-Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100, available at
<http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/detail/d200l-10.pdf>, at 2
[hereinafter Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010]; see also infra
note 30 and accompanying text.
For the purposes of this paper "elderly persons" are defined as being sixty years or
older, and all population counts and projections are based solely on results from the 1990
census. As of the date of publication of this note, the results from the 2000 census have
not been sufficiently determined to permit a detailed analysis of the United States
population by age. The author suggests that all estimates of projected incidences of elder
abuse in this note are underestimated by at least 2.5% since the population predictions
derived from the 1990 census proved to be approximately 2.5% lower than the actual
population in the United States on April 1, 2000. Compare STATISTICAL INFORMATION
STAFF, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. POPClock Projection, March 26, 2000, at
<http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/popclock> (visited March 26, 2000) (predicting the
population on that date to be 274,488,338), with POPULATION DIVISION, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, First Census 2000 Results-Resident Population and Apportionment Counts,
available at <http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html> (visited Jan. 29, 2001)
(showing the number of persons counted on April 1, 2000 to actually be 281,421,906).
15. Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 1.
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thirds of the abusers will be adult children or the spouses of those
adult children,16 thus first in line to inherit from their victims. Many
of these victims will be fatally injured by their abusers, 17 which makes
it possible for the courts to step in after the fact and prevent the
abusers from inheriting their victims' estates.18 However, since states
generally do not require such forfeitures unless a victim's death
results in an abuser's conviction for voluntary manslaughter or
murder, 19 many such victims,.if not most, will pass on their estates to
16. Id
17. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994); People v. McKelvey I1, 230
Cal. App. 3d 399 (1991).
18. See infra Part II.C.5 for a discussion of "slayer statutes."
19. The availability of slayer statutes does not guarantee that abusers who kill do not
inherit. Slayer statutes are typically, if not always, directed at persons that "feloniously
and intentionally killf- the decedent." UNIF. PROB. CODE §2-803(b) (Martindale-Hubbell
Uniform and Model Acts 1999). The estate case of Cheatle v. Cheatle directly illustrates
the difficulty courts have in applying slayer statutes to cases in which an abuser's neglect
caused the death of the decedent. See 662 A.2d 1362 (D.C. 1995).
In Cheatle, the decedent's brother, Harry, challenged the decedent's will, in which
everything was left to his sister Lorene. Harry asserted several claims, two of which were:
(1) that the will had been "revoked by operation of law because Lorene abused and
neglected the [decedent]," and (2) that "Lorene forfeited her status as beneficiary by
intentionally undermining the decedent's health to hasten his death." Harry claimed that
Lorene,
aware that she alone stood to benefit under the [decedent's] will, "engaged in a
pattern of conduct that undermined the [decedent's] health and shortened his
life." Specifically, Harry asserted that Lorene failed to provide the [decedent]
with sufficient food and water and failed to keep him clean; isolated him from
friends and relatives; assumed control of his finances without his consent;
interfered with the care provided to the [decedent] by independent home care
professionals; and sexually abused the [decedent].
Id. at 1363.
The trial court found that Lorene essentially did everything to the decedent that his
brother claimed she did, and that her conduct did shorten the decedent's life. However,
the court also found that Lorene had not acted with "deliberate, specific malice" toward
him. The trial court found that her actions "amounted to 'benign neglect.. . , indeed,
perhaps very close to if not actual gross neglect,"' but that since her conduct was not
willful or specifically designed to hasten the decedent's death, it could not disinherit her.
Id. at 1364.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia affirmed the trial
court's ruling on the ground that although a conviction for either manslaughter or murder
triggers the District of Columbia's slayer statute and bars inheritance, the common-law
requirement of intent must be met to justify a common-law bar to inheritance in the
absence of such a conviction. Id at 1366. The court held that even a finding in a civil
proceeding that a death was caused by a beneficiary's gross negligence is insufficient to
trigger the common-law bar to inheritance if the trial court also found that the beneficiary
did not intend to kill or injure the deceased. See id.
Note, however, that unlike the District of Columbia law, not all slayer statutes bar
inheritance in cases of involuntary manslaughter. The common-law rule which states that
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their abusers unless they exercise their testamentary capacity to
disinherit them. Most victims, however, will be ashamed, afraid,
isolated, and so controlled by their abusers that they won't be able to
reach out for help, much less punish the behavior by disinheriting the
abusers.20
The value-neutral posture of and testamentary freedoms
embedded in the traditional American model of inheritance currently
permit family-member abusers to neglect, coerce, and torture their
elders with impunity, that is, if they can dominate the victim
sufficiently to prevent themselves from being disinherited.21 But a
legal solution is available: integrating portions of a behavior-based
philosophy of inheritance into American inheritance schemes could
strengthen familial ties and reduce the abuse.22  California has
recently, and perhaps inadvertently, taken a first step toward doing
just that.23 But it is a step that is, by itself, insufficient to accomplish
this goal.24 To strengthen its arsenal in the fight against elder abuse,
California should effectively incorporate a behavior-based strategy
into its inheritance scheme. To do so, California, and indeed any
state, should first acknowledge the approach for what it is, understand
its value, and dedicate itself to integrating the philosophy into its
inheritance law.
This Note will first examine the elder abuse problem in the
United States by describing: state responses to its "discovery" in the
late 1970s and the reliance upon reporting that hamstrings efforts to
end abuse; the remedies that are currently available to abused elders
and the hurdles facing those that wish to utilize those remedies; the
ethical challenges to the states' primary prevention tools, and the
only persons convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter could be disinherited by the
state was expanded to bar persons in the District of Columbia convicted of involuntary
manslaughter by D.C. Code section 19-320. See Cheatle, 662 A2d at 1367. Thus, the
language of each state's slayer statue will dictate which levels of conviction are sufficient
to trigger a statutory bar to inheritance. In the absence of such criminal convictions
(which must be achieved by a standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt") or slayer
statutes, however, a finding of specific intent to kill or injure is required to bar an abusing
beneficiary from inheriting. Cf. id.
20. Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf. Elder Abuse and Neglect-
The Legal Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 100 (1998).
21. See Foster, supra note 1, at 79-80.
22. See id. at 81. This note does not purport to be a psychological treatment of the
causes of, or solutions to, such family dynamics, but rather, focuses solely on what impact
inheritance law can have on such situations.




dramatic explosion in elder abuse that is already, underway. Then,
this Note will describe American descent doctrines, and the
philosophies underlying exceptions to the doctrinal testamentary
freedom and value-neutrality of intestate succession. It will propose
the Chinese behavior-based model of inheritance as an alternative
scheme of inheritance that, with its unique ability to punish
misconduct and encourage familial ties, could effectively reduce elder
abuse without implicating many of the challenges to traditional
prevention methods. Finally, this Note will evaluate California
Probate Code section 259, identify why it represents a radical
departure from the traditional American inheritance model, explain
why it is in fact based upon the same principles as Chinese behavior-
based inheritance statutes, and argue that a limited adoption of these
principles would be possible, just, and effective in the fight against the
rising tide of elder abuse.
I. Elder Abuse in the United States
More than forty-six million Americans, over 16.56% of the
nation's entire population, are currently sixty years or older and at
risk for elder abuse.25 The elderly experience increased vulnerability
to abuse from family members and caretakers as they become frail,
dependent, and hampered by loss of physical and mental faculties.2 6
Sadly, 90% of known perpetrators of elder abuse are family
members-two-thirds of them adult children or spouses of adult
children.27 Despite the "discovery" of elder abuse in the late 1970s,2
8
national data on its prevalence or escalation in the United States is
scarce.29 Nevertheless, the best estimates suggest that approximately
5% of America's elderly may be abused annually,30 which means that
more than 2.3 million elderly persons, at current population
estimates, will be abused this year.31
25. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14,
at 2.
26. Robert A. Polisky, Criminalizing Physical and Emotional Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER
L.J. 377,379-80 (1995).
27. Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 1.
28. Polisky, supra note 26, at 380.
29. Id. at 380.
30. Id. at 381.
31. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14,
January 2001]
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Disturbingly, as they get older, elderly persons are more likely to
be emotionally, physically, or financially abused.32 The National
Elder Abuse Incidence Study, conducted in 1996, found that
categorizing victims of emotional, physical, and financial abuse by age
and type of abuse revealed a clear pattern: elders constitute an
increasingly larger percentage of the victims of all three types of
abuse as they advance in age.33 Figure 1-1 shows the distribution of
abuse among age groups. 34 The plight of the very oldest Americans
comes into sharp focus when one realizes that American elders bear
an increasing proportion of the abuse as they age despite the fact that
as they age they constitute an ever decreasing proportion of the
elderly population. 35
Figure 1-1
Age Breakdown For Each Type of Abuse
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32. Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 4-13.
33. See id.
34. Figure 1-1 was compiled from data presented in a similar chart in The National
Elder Abuse Incidence Study. See id.
35. See id.; see also Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra
note 14, at 1. See infra Figure 1-2 (showing the distribution of the elderly in 1996




A solution to this crisis has yet to be found. Though most states
have attempted to address the elder abuse problem,37 it continues to
worsen.38
36. Figure 1-2 represents the estimated breakdown of the elder population (sixty and
over) in increments of five years. Figure 1-2 was compiled from information provided by
the United States Bureau of the Census. See POPULATION ESTIMATES PROGRAM, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Age and Sex:
April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, at <http:lwww.census.gov/populationlestimates/nationlintfile
2-1.txt> (last visited Oct. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Resident Population Estimates by Age and
Sex: April1990 to July 19991.
37. By 1991, fifty states, including the District of Columbia and Guam, had "enacted
some type of legislation that addresse[d] the problem of elder abuse." Audrey S. Garfield,
Note, Elder Abuse and the States Adult Protective Services Response: Time for a Change in
California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 869 (1991).
38. Between 1986 and 1996 the total number of elderly persons aged sixty and older
increased by about 10% while the official reports of elder abuse and neglect grew by a
whopping 150%. Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 19. While it is true that
these numbers could be the result of state legislation designed to increase the reporting of
abuse, The National Center on Elder Abuse and Westat, Inc. completed a study in 1996
that shows that only one in five new incidents of elder abuse are being reported. This rate
does not reflect an improvement over 1981 estimates. Id. at 4; Polisky, supra note 26, at
381. However, the results of The National Elder Abuse Study also suggest that a
significant amount of abuse still evades detection because of the number of elders that live
in relative isolation away from the investigatory eyes of community organizations and
those trained, obligated, or even likely to report suspected elder abuse. Elder Abuse
Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 19.
Age Breakdown of the Elderly Population
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A. Background Information
(1) The "Discovery" of Elder Abuse
In 1974, state programs providing protective services for adults
became mandatory under Title XX of the Social Security Act.
39
Those programs were designed to provide "a system of preventative,
supportive, and surrogate services for the elderly living in the
community to enable them to maintain independent living and avoid
abuse and exploitation. ' 40 When the American public began to focus
on elder abuse in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress provided
little help to states dealing with the problem. Despite the House of
Representatives' 1981 recommendation that Congress assist the states
in identifying and treating elder abuse victims, a dramatic decrease in
Federal Title XX block grant funding in the 1980s left the states to
fund and create their own programs to fight elder abuse themselves.
41
Thus, elders have been left largely at the mercy of state programs that
have proved legislatively and financially inadequate to deal with the
problem effectively. 42
(2) State Responses
Most, if not all, state legislatures have enacted specific measures
designed to assist in the prevention of elder abuse.43 Many have
incorporated such statutes into existing adult protective services
programs. Others have expanded the use of domestic violence
statutes and criminal prosecutions to include the protection of
elders.44
Adult protective services programs, designed to identify and
reach out to victims, usually make use of two common approaches to
abuse prevention. 45 First, a host of educational, medical, and
therapeutic services are provided for at-risk adults.46  Second,
39. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 83.
40. John Regan, Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs, 18
GERONTOLOGIST 250,251 (1978).
41. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 83-84. The House of Representatives report was
titled Elder Abuse: An Examination of a Hidden Problem. Id. at 83.
42. See id. at 84.
43. By 1991, fifty states, including the District of Columbia and Guam, had "enacted
some type of legislation that addresse[d] the problem of elder abuse." Garfield, supra
note 37, at 869.
44. Garfield, supra note 37, at 869-71.
45. See id. at 869-70.
46. See id. at 870.
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legislatures often empower the state or one of its agencies to legally
intervene in abusive situations and to make decisions affecting the
victim's life.47 Empowering the state or its agencies to act on behalf
of elder abuse victims usually includes an assortment of provisions
addressing specific concerns such as: mandatory reporting
requirements for enumerated professionals, investigation procedures
and rules, and involuntary and emergency intervention procedures.4
8
(3) Reliance on Mandatory Reporting
Despite legislation providing for intervention in elder abuse
cases, states cannot make use of their treatment, rehabilitative, or
remedial programs until they become aware of specific allegations of
abuse. Thus, states must await reports of suspected elder abuse
before they can end, treat, or punish it. Currently, forty-four states,
including the District of Columbia, require a variety of professionals
to report their discovery or suspicion of elder abuse in order to
provide the information needed for intervention. 49 Health care and
social service personnel such as nurses, physicians, police officers and
social workers are typical "mandatory reporters" 50 since they have
unique opportunities to observe the elderly.
B. Legal Remedies
Elder abuse, like child or domestic abuse, is almost always a
crime, since nearly all forms of elder abuse correspond to behavior
prohibited..under state law.51 In addition, many states have created
statutes specifically criminalizing different types of elder abuse,52 and
have equipped their criminal justice systems to protect victims by
providing them with restraining orders, orders to vacate premises,
and restitution for theft and medical expenses.5 3 Thus, abuse can be
stopped, criminally charged, and prosecuted when victims have access
47. Id.
48. It
49. Until recently this number was forty-three. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 94.
However, effective January 1, 1999, Illinois law was amended to require that "mandated
reporters" report suspicions of abuse.... 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4-4(a-5) (West
Supp. 2000).
50. Garfield, supra note 37, at 874.
51. See Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 97.
52. See iL at 98.
53. See id at 97.
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to the courts. In addition, when an abuser owes fiduciary duties to a
victim, civil remedies are available to provide compensation.54
(1) Barriers to Remedies
Unfortunately, elder abuse victims rarely report their
victimization. 55  Studies show that some victims feel that the
mistreatment is normal or that the law can do nothing to help them.
56
Others may be so physically isolated from people to whom they could
reach out that there are no opportunities to ask for help.57 Given that
90% of all abusers are members of the victims' families, it is not
surprising that victims do not report. According to Moskowitz,
"[v]ictims are often particularly reluctant to proceed against family
members because of embarrassment, shame, lack of third party
emotional support, and failure of the criminal justice system to
accommodate victims' needs.
'58
In addition, even those victims who are willing to report abuse
may find it particularly difficult to get access to the legal system. The
most abused elders live in poverty and cannot afford to pay legal
fees.59 And, it can be difficult to provide attorneys with enough
financial incentive to take cases on a contingency fee basis.
6°
Evidentiary problems also abound in these cases because elder abuse
victims often suffer from confusion 61 or speech difficulties that make
it difficult to put on a convincing case. This is yet another
disincentive for attorneys.62 Finally, even if a victim retains a lawyer,
many exceptionally frail elderly persons do not live long enough to
see a judgment at the end of a lengthy litigation process.
63
54. Id. at 102.
55. See Garfield, supra note 37, at 881-82.
56. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 100.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Only 9.5% of neglect victims, 25% of emotional abuse victims, 24.5% of physical
abuse victims, and 22.4% of financial abuse victims in 1996 had an income of $15,000 or
higher. Not one abandonment victim had an income this high. Elder Abuse Incidence
Study, supra note 13, at 4-15.
60. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 104.
61. In 1996 31.6% of victims "were very confused, or disoriented, and 27.9 percent
were sometimes confused." See Elder Abuse Incidence Study. supra note 13, at 6.
62. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 105.
63. Id. at 104.
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(2) Improving Access
Some states, attempting to improve access to the legal system for
abused elders, have recently begun to experiment with additional civil
remedies for victims of elder abuse.64 For example, California passed
The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act in
1992.65 It attempts to enable victims to more readily retain attorneys
by creating new civil remedies for those victims who can prove by
"clear and convincing" evidence that a defendant "has been guilty of
recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of
abuse."
66
Illinois is experimenting with treble damages and attorney fees in
the case of proven financial abuse, regardless of the outcome in a
criminal case.67 In Maine, an elderly person can now obtain a court
order for the return of property that was taken from her as a result of
undue influence.68 Furthermore, if the victim gave up real estate or
more than 10% of her personal property or money for less than fair
market value to a person who owed her a fiduciary duty, courts
presume undue influence. 69  In addition, schemes shifting
investigation and protective services costs to the abuser are being
tried in Washington and the District of Columbia.70 Abusers
convicted in the criminal system for emotional or physical abuse of an
elder may also be ordered to pay restitution to their victims. 71 These
new civil remedies are especially important, since the nature of purely
physical or emotional injuries may make it difficult for courts to truly
affect restitution.7 2 However, despite these attempts to encourage
64. See id. at 105.
65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-15675 (West Supp. 2000).
66. Moskowitz, supra note 20, at 105.




71. See People v. Balestra, 76 Cal. App. 4th 57, 63-64 (1999).
72. The Balestra case is a good example of this difficulty. Despite the emotional and
physical injuries Balestra inflicted upon her mother, the court only ordered her to pay
$7,198 in restitution-which was to cover the cost of the orthodontia work the victim
required after the beating. See Balestra, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 62.
In California there must be a rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered and
that restitution must result from a foreseeable financial loss to the victim. See CAL PENAL
CODE § 1202.4 (West 2000). The statute indicates that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature
that a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a
crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1202.4(a)(1). The statute goes on to make clear that only economic losses
are to be compesated:
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victim reporting, at least five out of six victims remain quiet,73 and the
abuse continues.74 Thus, identifying the victims is still a serious
obstacle to providing remedies.
C. Challenging Mandatory Reporting
Mandatory reporting laws, the states' most widely used weapon
against elder abuse, are based on the theory that finding and
identifying elder abuse victims is the first step to prevention. 5 This
theory is grounded in early studies indicating "that abused elderly
would not seek help for themselves .... [since] '[p]ride,
embarrassment, fear, isolation, lack of access to services, and mental
confusion are all obstacles to [elderly] acknowledging.., abuse and
seeking professional assistance."' 76  However, the widespread
acceptance of mandatory reporting laws as an effective tool in the
fight against elder abuse has come under attack recently.
77
Critics argue that the assumption of helplessness underlying
mandatory reporting systems promotes ageism.7 8 They also claim that
mandatory disclosure of confidential information by persons normally
required to maintain client confidences has a deleterious effect on the
strength of privileged communications and the willingness of victims
of abuse to seek assistance on their own.79 Additionally, some argue
that reliance on mandatory reporting programs fails to expose abuse
that would otherwise go unreported.80 Finally, the ability to reduce
abuse, arguably the sole redeeming feature of an incredibly intrusive
In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution
to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the
amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f) (West 2000). Thus, California's restitution program does
not provide restitution for any injuries other than economic losses suffered as a direct
result of the crime, which means that victims seeking injuries for pain and suffering must
go through the tort system in a separate civil action. See id. Of course, the ability of each
state that has a restitution program to compensate victims of abuse will be directly related
to how each program defines which injuries are compensable through mandatory
restitution upon conviction.
73. See Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 4.
74. See Garfield, supra note 37, at 882.
75. See id. at 881.
76. Id. at 881-82 (quoting Lau & Kosberg, Abuse of the Elderly by Informal Care
Providers, AGING, Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 11).
77. See id. at 882.
78. See id. at 884-85.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 882.
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system, has been decried as illusory since the states have very limited
funds to dedicate to adult protective services programs once victims
are found.8'
Elder abuse is a growing problem in America. With an estimated
five out of every six new incidents of elder abuse going unreported,
82
a system that promotes healthier relationships among family
members and promotes reporting without requiring it is in order.
D. Future Projections
The proportion of the American population at risk for elder
abuse will increase sharply in the coming years. The elderly
population is expected to grow significantly as a result of the United
States' "demographic transition,"83 a gradual societal change from
high fertility and mortality rates to low ones. This shift will lead to a
more even distribution of the population across a much broader age
range.84 It will also coincide with the aging of the baby boomers,85
who will begin to turn sixty in 2006.86 As of July 2001, more than 46
million people are expected to be sixty years or older in this nation,
87
81. See id.
82. This figure represents the estimate that only one in six new incidents were
reported in 1996. See Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 4.
83. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Aging in the
Americas into the XXI century I at <http://www.census.gov/icp/prod/ageame
.pdf> (visited Mar. 26,2000).
84. See id
85. See id. at 4. According to population projections, the growth rate of the
percentage of the American population that is sixty years or older will outstrip the growth
rate of the overall American population by the year 2007 (although this will occur in 2003
also, the phenomenon will not be a consistent one until 2007). For more detailed
information about the upcoming shift in population percentages by age, see Figure 2-1.
See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14, at 2;
STATISTICAL INFORMATION STAFF, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Projections of the Resident
Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100, available at
<http:llwww.census.gov/populationlprojections/nationldetailld2Oll_20.pdf> (visited on
Mar. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2011-2020];
<http:lwww.census.gov/populationlprojectionslnationldetailld2021_30.pdf> (visited on
Mar. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2021-2030];
<http://www.census.gov/population/projectionslnation/detaild2031_40.pdf> (visited on
Mar. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2031-2040];
<http:/lwww.census.gov/populationlprojections/nationldetailld2041_50.pdf> (visited on
Mar.26, 2000) [hereinafter Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2041-2050].
86. See U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGING, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Aging in
the United States-Pas4 Present and Future: From Pyramid to Rectangle: The Progression
of Aging, at <http:llwww.census.govlipclprod/97agewc.pdf> (visited Mar. 26, 2000).
87. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14, at
2; Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note 13, at 1.
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and more than 9.5 million of those will be over eighty.8 Those
populations will explode to nearly twice their current size by 2027.89
According to the Census Bureau, nearly 57.5 million Americans
are expected to be sixty or older in 2011 (11.5 million of them eighty
or older),90 and the number is expected to jump to more than 62.5
million in 2014.91 By 2027, Americans sixty or older should number
nearly 86 million (over 16 million of them aged eighty and older).
92
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show how this surge in the elderly population is
already ramping up. Figure 2-1 shows the projected steady growth of
the elderly population over the next fifty years. 93
Figure 2-1
Elders as a Changing Percentage of Overall
Population






Per Year from 2001-2050
Approximately 5% of all elderly persons are abused each year
94
and victims aged eighty and older seem to be bearing more than 66%
88. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14,
at 2.
89. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2021-2030, supra note 85,
at 7.
90. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2011-2020, supra note 85,
at 1.
91. See id. at 4.
92. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2021-2030, supra note 85,
at 7.
93. Figure 2-1 shows that the aging of the baby boomers will cause an increasing
percentage of the American population to fall within the category at risk for elder abuse.
Figure 1-3 was compiled with statistics available on Bureau of the Census population
projections. See Resident Population Estimates by Age and Sex: April 1990 to July 1999,
supra note 36.
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of the abuse.95 Thus, 1.52 million of the 2.3 million elderly abuse
victims are over eighty.96 The current number of victims is staggering,
but it could get worse; unless the progression is somehow checked,
the number of victims is expected to nearly double with the growth of
the elderly population between now and 2027.97 Nearly 3.1 million
elderly persons98 will experience abuse in 2014,99 and by 2027, since
one of out of every four Americans will be sixty or older,1°° nearly
4.29 million elderly persons will be abused.101 In 2027, more elderly
persons over the age of eighty (2.38 million) will be abused than the
total number of elderly persons being abused today.
1°2
H. American Descent Doctrines
Americans have the right to direct the disposition of their
property after their deaths.103 As a corollary to this right, Americans
may inherit property from others through testamentary transfers or
through the intestate succession laws that come into play if a
deceased fails to leave a valid will. However, these inheritance rights
are not absolute.104 Neither natural rights nor the Constitution
guarantee inheritance rights to Americans, and so the ability to devise
property to others or to take under a will or intestate succession laws
may be restricted by legislative action. 0 5
95. Victims were found to be eighty or older in 51.8% of the neglect cases, 41.3% of
the emotional abuses cases, 43.7% of the physical abuse cases, 48% of the financial abuse
cases, and 19.8% of the abandonment cases. See Elder Abuse Incidence Study, supra note
13, at 4-13.
96. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2001-2010, supra note 14,
at 2.
97. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2021-2030, supra note 85, at
1; Polisky, supra note 26, at 381.
98. See Projections of the Resident Population by Age for 2011-2020, supra note 85,
at 4.
99. See Polisky, supra note 26, at 381.




103. English citizens have had this right since the first Statute of Wills was written in
1540. 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1 (1540). All American states have also granted the privilege since
their creations. See James L. Robertson, Essays: Myths and Reality- Or Is it "Perception
and Taste"?-In the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1045, 1051
(1993).




Though inheritance rights may be restricted, the government
probably cannot completely eliminate them for both constitutional
and pragmatic reasons.10 6 The government has broad "authority to
adjust the rules governing the descent and devise of property without
implicating the guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause," but
that power has limitations. 0 7 While the United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged the government's power to adjust the rules of
descent, the Court has also held that "total abrogation of the
right to pass property [would be] unprecedented and likely
unconstitutional.' '108
A. The Power to Devise Property: Testamentary Freedom
Testamentary freedom, the ability to direct where one's property
goes after one's death, comports with American ideals.10 9 The
primary theory underlying testamentary freedom is a natural rights
theory. Endorsed by John Locke, natural rights theory stands for the
proposition that the person who creates wealth has a natural right to
dispose of it in whatever manner he or she sees fit.110 Additionally,
authors such as Jeremy Bentham have focused on the utilitarian
notion that since people enjoy bequeathing property to others,
testamentary freedom creates an incentive to industry and saving."'
A corollary to this argument suggests that the value of property
would decline if the government were to limit the ability to devise
property after death. This would thereby remove an incentive for
wealth creation and reduce the total amount of wealth in the
nation."2
106. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987). Practically speaking, inheritance
is politically popular. If the government tried to end inheritance practices, it would be
nearly impossible to curtail them successfully. Because under the "takings clause" of the
Constitution property cannot be taken from owners, the government could do nothing
about gifts that property owners make during their lifetimes. The nature of the
inheritance scheme might change to reflect the appearance of giving during one's lifetime,
but the system would essentially remain the same, and an incredibly large administrative
agency would be required in order to keep track of gifts. See Adam J. Hirsch & William
K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992) in, JOEL C.
DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 12-13 (1998).
107. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718.
108. Id. at 716.
109. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 12-13.





Despite challenges to the validity of the rationales explained
above,113 Americans have come to expect testamentary freedom.
This expectation rests on the force of history and the incorporation of
testamentary freedom into our cultural values. Quite simply, most
people in America want to pass on any advantage they can gain in
this world to their children.114 However, testamentary freedom, like
most freedoms, has a darker side that must also be tolerated.
Testamentary freedom, by definition, includes the right to
dispose of property in ways that some might think are unusual or
unproductive. Judges strive to take a disinterested view of testators'
beneficiary and devise choices; to do otherwise would render these
choices meaningless. Thus, testators are equally free to heap fortune
upon their loved ones, fund important medical research, create a trust
that will ensure that a pet will live in the lap of luxury for the rest of
its life, or fund a post-funeral wake-of-the-century for their friends
and family.
Indeed, testamentary freedom allows a person to devise property
to a beneficiary that is a known wastrel, to disinherit close family
members (with limited exceptions), or to create a trust that is
designed to pursue goals that serve little useful public purpose.
Courts will only refuse to enforce testamentary wishes if they convey
no social utility, such as an attempt to commit waste or destruction of
property." 5 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, if the representative
of the deceased can produce a valid will and prove the will to a court's
satisfaction," 6 then it will be enforced without any investigation into
the relationships between the beneficiaries and the decedent.
113. Mark Ascher argues that current inheritance schemes undermine the American
ideology of equal opportunity. He argues that some families, by transferring wealth down
through generations, give an unfair advantage to those who have done nothing to earn it,
have not learned to hold such fortunes without squandering them, and who lack any
incentive to be productive citizens. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89
MICH. L. REV. 69,69-76 (1990), in JOEL C. DOBRIS & STEWART E. STERK, ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 9-11 (1998).
114. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 12-13.
115. Professor Gail Bird, Lecture at Hastings College of the Law (Sept. 1999).
116. While it is true that courts will refuse to execute a will if it was fraudulently made
or if undue influence or duress was exercised upon the testator in its creation, these issues
are usually resolved in the process of proving the will to the court. For the purposes of
this note, the discussion focuses upon those decedents that either leave no will (with their
abusers first in line to inherit through intestate succession), and those testators that either:
1) included persons in their will on a previous occasion and are later abused by those
persons and prevented from changing the terms of that will, or 2) actually choose to
include abusers in their wills under circumstances in which fraud, undue influence, or
duress is not proven.
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B. Status and the Value-Neutral Posture of Intestate Succession Statutes
Intestate statutes, statutes that determine who gets what when a
decedent has failed to leave a will, are fashioned using a "presumed
intent" approach that approximates the type of succession that most
people are assumed to want.117 To most closely approximate the
presumed intent of the decedent, intestate succession laws in America
apply rigid rules of inheritance that mechanically determine intestate
inheritance patterns based purely on status." 8 American intestate
succession statutes determine the beneficiaries of decedents' intestate
estates by determining the "decedents' closest relatives by blood,
adoption, or marriage." Property is then passed to these individuals
"irrespective of their actual conduct toward the decedent." 119 In
essence, the prevailing American view is that children do not have to
be well-behaved to inherit from their parents.
120
As default rules that apply in the absence of clear testamentary
intent, intestate succession laws are meant to mirror the desires of
most people, most of the time, so that personal, legal, and societal
costs of transferring a decedent's property to the living can be kept to
a minimum.121 Courts and legislatures have adopted this institutional
posture of value-neutrality, with only a few exceptions, 122 when
enforcing wills and designing and applying intestate succession
statutes. This approach simplifies and accelerates the probate process
while keeping courts and other government agencies from intruding
unnecessarily upon intimate family relationships.
C. Exceptions to American Descent Doctrines
Value-neutrality can be an unsatisfying judicial approach in
extraordinary circumstances. Some situations, like murder motivated
by a desire to inherit, or the spiteful disinheritance of a faithful and
loving spouse or dependent child, cry out for a different approach.
As a result, existing testamentary freedom doctrine is peppered with
a number of exceptions. Likewise, the value-neutral approach that
most states have traditionally used when crafting intestate succession
laws has its own exceptions designed to parallel the limitations on
117. Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257,276 (1994).
118. Foster, supra note 1, at 79.
119. See id.
120. See id at 80.
121. See Monopoli, supra note 117, at 276.
122. See id at 259.
[Vol. 52
EXTINGUISHING INHERITANCE RIGHTS
testamentary freedoms generally and to ensure that vulnerable
members of society are taken care of.
Two general categories of exceptions to the traditional value-
neutral posture in wills and trusts jurisprudence have been
developed. 123 First, in very limited circumstances, courts will create
forced heirships by providing for persons that were not satisfactorily
provided for in a testamentary document.124 Second, the courts will
sometimes extinguish the inheritance rights of persons who are
deemed to be "unworthy heirs."'1 5
(1) Forced Heirship: Spouses
Forced heirship is not normally a characteristic of inheritance
schemes in the United States. 126 Rather, testators have extraordinary
freedom to decide who will inherit their property after their deaths.127
However, despite a policy favoring testamentary freedom, most states
have determined that certain responsibilities or relationships
deceased persons had with others in life should not be disregarded in
death. 128 Virtually every state aims to protect surviving spouses,
especially surviving spouses still raising children, from accidental or
intentional disinheritance. 129 This protection can either take the form
123. See infra notes 126-57.
124. See infra notes 126-41.
125. See infra notes 143-59.
126. See Monopoli, supra note 117, at 259 n.8.
127. See id
128. For example, North Carolina bars parents that willfully abandoned a child from
intestate succession in any part of the child's estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. 31A-2 (1999). The
Uniform Probate Code provides for a mandatory portion of a deceased's estate to go to
the surviving spouse, depending on the length of the marriage, the number of children
from the marriage and from previous marriages, and the property already owned by the
surviving spouse. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform
and Model Acts 1999). New York provides for the forfeiture of an elective share for a
surviving spouse if that spouse neglected or deserted the decedent within the last year of
the decedent's life. N.Y. EST. POWERS OF TRUST LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 1998).
129. See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 106, at 145.
Some states, such as California, have adopted community property systems to ensure
that surviving spouses get a fair share of a decedent's estate. Upon the death of a spouse
in California, all property that was acquired during the marriage is termed community
property, and only half of that property is considered part of the decedent's estate for
purposes of descent. The rest of the property automatically goes to the surviving spouse.
See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 28,70, 100 (West 1999).
Other states have adopted an elective share approach that allows surviving spouses to
"elect" whether or not they want to take a statutorily mandated share from the estate.
The share can be a specified sum or a specified proportion of the estate. In addition, the
sum can vary according to how many children the couple had together and with others,
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of statutorily mandated shares for surviving spouses or the adoption
of community property laws that allow a surviving spouse to
automatically receive half of all the property acquired by the couple
during the marriage.
This protection is usually extended to the surviving spouse
because marriage is viewed as a partnership. Spouses are presumed
to have intended when they married to pool their resources and funds
to build a home and family.130 Spouses often fill different roles in the
family, and these differing roles may have inherently different earning
potential, even though both may be equally vital to the survival of the
marriage and the resulting family.131 If a bread winner dies, leaving
behind a spouse who invested in the marriage by staying home to
raise children, that spouse ought not to lose the benefit of that
investment through disinheritance.
Additional surviving spouse rights have been carved out of the
testamentary freedom doctrine as well. Many states provide a limited
exception granting a homestead allowance, 132 which provides
additional funds (in excess of the spousal elective share) to insulate
the family from creditors. Some provide for family allowances,1 33
which are funds given to family members that the decedent was
obligated to support, and was in fact supporting before death, to
enable them to survive during administration of the estate. Finally,
some of the decedent's property (such as household furniture,
appliances, automobiles, and personal effects) 134 can be declared
exempt property that the spouse or children may take before the
estate is valued at probate. As a public policy matter, those persons
ought to be provided for instead of allowing a decedent to satisfy
some debt, grudge, or angry whim by leaving his family impoverished.
and with the length of the marriage. See sections 2-201 through 2-207 of the Uniform
Probate Code for an example of an incredibly complicated elective share calculation.
130. See Helen Shapo, A Tale of Two Systems: Anglo-American Problems in the
Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 707, 722, 724-25 (1993);
DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 106, at 146.
131. Id.
132. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402 (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts
1999).
133. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-404 (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts
1999).
134. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-403 (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts
1999).
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(2) Forced Heirship: Children
Most states grant some narrow protection to children against
accidental, but not intentional, 135 disinheritance. "Pretermitted child
statutes" grant protections to children omitted from wills in two
narrow types of situations.136 First, children born after the execution
of a parent's will, in the absence of a clear intent to the contrary, are
often read into the will and treated equally with the decedent's other
children. 37 Second, most states will read children that have been
unintentionally disinherited back into the will, since they consider the
disinheritance of children to be against public policy.
138
(3) Forced Heirship: Parents of Minor Children
Finally, when the decedent is a minor child, parents may also be
the beneficiaries of a form of forced heirship. 139 Minor children,
usually children under eighteen, though they may earn money and
own property, do not have the legal capacity to make testamentary
gifts.l'W Since default intestate succession schemes provide for the
transfer of property to a decedent's parents if the decedent has no
surviving spouse or child,141 minor children's estates are especially
likely to go to surviving parents. Thus, minor children do not have
the option of disinheriting their parents.
(4) The Mechanism of the "Unworthy Heir"
Under the English common law, prior to the Statute of Wills in
1540,142 inheritance law was primarily a system of forced heirship
provisions.143 The jurisprudence of "unworthy heirs" developed as a
mechanism to achieve justice in such a rigid system by preventing
heirs from inheriting property from decedents who would have
135. Louisiana is the sole exception to this approach. The state provides children with
protection against intentional disinheritance. See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 106, at
181.
136. See id.
137. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts
1999).
138. Most states claim that parents have complete testamentary freedom to disinherit
children, but to varying degrees, these states require that such disinheritance be explicit in
order to be effective. See DOBRIS & STERK, supra note 106, at 190.
139. See Monopoli, supra note 117, at 259 n.8.
140. Id. at 288.
141. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(b) (West 1999).
142. See supra note 103.
143. See Monopoli, supra note 117, at 259 n.8.
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disinherited them if they had had the freedom to do so. 144
Testamentary freedom in the United States has greatly reduced the
need and the justification for "unworthy heir" litigation because
people have the ability to disinherit their family members if they want
to. 145 However, a limited number of "unworthy heir" statutes are in
place to facilitate justice in circumstances where a deceased person
never had the option disinherit an heir.
t46
(5) American "Unworthy Heirs": Slayer Statutes
The most notable, and widely accepted, "unworthy heir"
exception to inheritance patterns is the extinguishing of inheritance
rights through "slayer statutes.' 1 47 Since the 1800s, courts have flatly
refused to permit murderers to benefit from their crimes by
inheriting, either under a will or through intestate succession statutes,
from people that they feloniously killed.148 Slayer statutes codified
what was previously the common law maxim ex turpis causa non actio,
that no one ought to benefit from his own evil, originally used in
England to deal with the problem of murderous heirs.149 The maxim
became American common law when it was adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in New York Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Armstrong in 1886.150 The Court held that "[i]t would be
a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover
insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had
feloniously taken.' ' 51 This rule was eventually adopted by the state
courts, beginning in 1889 in New York, with these resounding words
found in Riggs v. Palmer:
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take
advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
144. Id. Unworthy heir statutes are widely considered to descend from the English
Statute of Westminster 11 which, in 1890, caused a wife that committed adultery and ran off
with another man to forfeit her right of dower if her husband did not willingly reconcile
and live with her again before he died. This held true even if her husband never divorced
her. See In re Taylor's Estate, 82 S.W. 727, 728 (Indian Terr. 1904); see also Statute of
Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, c. 34 (1890).
145. Monopoli, supra note 117, at 259 n.8.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 259 n.9.
148. See New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886).
149. See Brian W. Underdahl, Note: Creating a New Public Policy in Estate of
O'Keefe: Judicial Legislation Using a Slayer Statute in a Novel Way, 44 S.D. L. REV. 828,
835 (1998-99).




iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims
are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law
administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been
superseded by statutes.
152
Today, most states have adopted slayer statutes which codify the
principles stated so eloquently in Riggs.153 Even the Uniform Probate
Code, adopted by the majority of states, codifies a translated version
of the common law maxim in its slayer statute.154
(6) American "Unworthy Heirs": Bad Spouses and Parents
A few states have also created two types of "unworthy heir"
statutes that "bar bad spouses and parents who fail to live up to
society's ideals of their legal and moral duties."'155
In some states, parents that abandon or fail to support children
during their minority, subject to varying conditions and exceptions,
are barred from inheriting from those children when they die.156 The
152. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
153. Underdahl, supra note 149, at 837.
154. The UNIF. PROB. CODE provides that
[a]n individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all
benefits under this Article with respect to the decedent's estate, including an
intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a
homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent
died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed his
[or her] intestate share.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts 1999).
The Uniform Probate Code also revokes general and specific powers of appointment
granted to the killer by the decedent and any nomination of the killer as a fiduciary,
representative, executor, trustee, or agent. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §2-803(c)(1)
(Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts 1999). Although the code also makes
other specific provisions to ensure that a killer does not unjustly profit from his felonious
act, it specifically adopts the words of the common law maxim to cover unexpected
situations: "[a] wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this
section must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from his
[or her] wrong." UNIF. PROB. CODE §2-803(f) (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model
Acts 1999).
155. Monopoli, supra note 117, at 274.
156. See id. at 260 n.11. Arguably, this was put in place to counteract the forced
heirship that results from the fact that minors are not considered legally competent to
create a will.
For example, Connecticut bars a parent from inheriting from a deceased child if the
parent abandoned the child as a minor and continued the abandonment until the child
died. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-439 (West 1999) (entitled "Distribution when there are no
children or representatives of them").
In New York, a parent generally cannot inherit from a deceased child if the parent
failed or refused to provide for, or has abandoned such child while such child is
under the age of twenty-one years, whether or not such child dies before having
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Uniform Probate Code, widely adopted by the states, also addresses
this exception. It provides that a natural parent (and the parent's
kindred) are precluded from inheriting from or through a child unless
"the natural parent has openly treated the child as his [or hers], and
has not refused to support the child. ' 157 In addition, some states, such
as New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, provide for
the forfeiture of inheritance rights under parallel conditions for
unworthy spouses. 158 Note, however, that rather than undermining
American testamentary freedoms, these "unworthy heir" statutes are
justifiable as narrow exceptions. These exceptions serve to provide
justice in the limited cases in which states have created forced
heirships that eliminate the deceased's ability to disinherit those
family members.159
II. An Alternative: Behavior-Based Models of Inheritance
Behavior-based models present an alternative to traditional
status-based models of inheritance. Behavior-based models have the
unique ability to strengthen families and deter abuse by encouraging
close familial relationships as well as punishing abusive behavior.16°
This system could deter abuse of vulnerable people by eliminating
heirs as beneficiaries of a decedent's estate if they meet a threshold of
either abandonment, neglect, or abuse that has been deemed
unacceptable by law.161 In addition, a behavior-based model of
inheritance could encourage close family ties and support structures
attained the age of twenty-one years, unless the parental relationship and duties
are subsequently resumed and continued until the death of the child.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §4-1.4(a) (McKinney 1998) (entitled "Disqualification
of parent to take intestate share").
In North Carolina, a parent that willfully abandons the care of a child loses any right
to intestate succession unless the duties were resumed for at least one year before the
child died and continued until the child's death or the parent was deprived of the custody
of the child by a court and the parent complied with all court orders pertaining to
monetary contributions for the child's welfare. N.C. GEN STAT. § 31A-2 (1999) (entitled
"Acts barring rights of parents").
157. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(c) (Martindale-Hubbell Uniform and Model Acts
1999).
158. Monopoli, supra note 117, at 259 n.8.
159. "Forced heirship in... narrow circumstances justifies an unworthy heir statute.
Depriving an American decedent of the usual ability to cut out someone who has wronged
him militates in favor of a statute which will accomplish that very act." Id. at 274.
160. See Foster, supra note 1, at 81.
161. See Monopoli, supra note 117, at 291-92.
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by rewarding exemplary conduct either in the process or the
outcomes of will probates.162
A. The Chinese System
In 1998, Frances H. Foster published what was perhaps the first
Western report on the People's Republic of China's developing
inheritance system, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?:
The Chinese Experiment. 63 He provided examples on the details and
difficulties of the system, and then posed provocative suggestions
about its applicability to modem problems in American families.
Foster suggested that study of the Chinese system, especially as it
adapts to changing social structures that are increasingly similar to
those in the United States, could offer some strong lessons about how
to deal with familial abuse.164
China has used a behavior-based model since 1985 which
"determines inheritance rights in accordance with the conduct of
heirs and claimants toward the decedent."'165 Chinese courts explicitly
consider both positive and negative behavior toward decedents
during their lives when determining the identity of beneficiaries and
gift size.
The Chinese behavior-based model encourages family ties and
support in two ways. First, the laws establish formal familial support
duties that clearly identify societal expectations. 66 Spouses must
support each other, parents and children must support each other at
varying times in their lives,167 grandparents and grandchildren must
support each other when the generation in between them is deceased,
and siblings must support each other if their parents are either
deceased or destitute. 68 Second, courts can both severely penalize
extreme neglect or abuse of family members and reward exemplary
conduct.
(1) Punishing Misconduct with Inheritance Law
The Chinese model cuts a broad swath by punishing a wide
variety of bad acts, identifying a large population of wrong-doers,
162. See Foster, supra note 1, at 81.
163. See i& at 77.
164. See id. at 125-26.
165. m at 81.
166. See id at 97.
167. Natural, adoptive, and stepparents and stepchildren are all bound by this rule. lIt
168. See itL
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defining "unworthy heirs" in exceptionally broad terms,169 and by
imposing the most serious sanctions in a wide variety of cases170 and
against a wide variety of persons, including even the lineal
descendants of "unworthy heirs."' 171  China's inheritance model
identifies a much broader category of "unworthy heirs" than
American models do, and these heirs, beneficiaries, and their lineal
descendants may be punished for their activities by either partial or
total reduction of their inheritance shares, depending on the
circumstances surrounding each case.
172
For example, slayers are barred from inheriting from their
victims, but heirs are also penalized for "abandonment,"
"mistreatment," and "failure to support" a decedent. 73 Unlike the
limited American "unworthy heir" statutes that punish only spousal
and parental misconduct, Chinese law evaluates and penalizes all
potential heirs for misconduct' 74 towards the decedent. The penalties
for misconduct vary, but the most severe sanction-total forfeiture of
inheritance rights-results if a potential heir killed the decedent or a
fellow heir while fighting over the estate, abandoned or mistreated
the decedent, or forged or otherwise tampered with or destroyed the
will.175
The Chinese model is particularly adept at punishing abuse or
neglect of family members because of the courts' ability to look to the
behavior of the heir and tailor punishments to that behavior. Chinese
courts may use the law to prevent an heir from inheriting from a
parent or grandparent that was elderly, ill, and destitute and for
which the heir refused to provide shelter, care or financial aid.176 At
the same time, however, courts are less likely to find abandonment if
169. The term "heirs" has been interpreted broadly to include beneficiaries under a
will, thereby expanding the effect of unworthy heir statutes to include both intestate
transfers and testamentary transfers. See id. at 87-88.
170. Id. at 87.
171. The term "heirs" has also been construed liberally to mean that when an heir is
barred from inheriting, his entire bloodline is similarly tainted and disinherited. See id. at
88-89.
172. See id. at 84.
173. Id. at 86 (footnotes omitted).
174. Misconduct is not limited to abusive or neglectful behavior, but includes offenses
that go against the decedent's lifetime wishes, such as destroying, forging or altering wills
under serious circumstances, obstructing proper disposition of the estate, failing to
perform obligations enumerated in a will, misappropriating estate property, and
murdering a fellow heir. See id.
175. Id. at 86-87.
176. Id. at 95-96.
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the heir was financially or physically unable to perform familial
obligations.177 Thus, courts tend to punish only egregious behavior
rather than unfortunate but unavoidable results.
(2) Strengthening Familial Relationships with Inheritance Law
The Chinese system also encourages the strengthening of family
ties and support structures by rewarding exemplary behavior in all
walks of life. Courts take a broad view of what constitutes an heir's
"duty of support," often rewarding people for assistance in financial,
physical, or emotional matters.178 In addition to rewarding family
heirs, Chinese courts may also reward step-relatives, in-laws, and non-
blood-relatives for superlative efforts, thereby encouraging the
development of alternate support structures. Courts may reward
people by upwardly adjusting inheritance shares,179 elevating step-
relatives or in-laws that had "support relationships" with the
decedent to an equal intestate heir status,180 and even allocating
legacies to worthy "non-heirs.' 18'
B. The Chinese Find Success
The Chinese system has already seen some success. It has helped
create private support structures for the elderly, the disabled, and
minors.182 The government has used the system to inculcate Chinese
society with new standards and norms, which have, in turn, reduced
conflict within families. 83  More importantly, the system has
succeeded in creating an estate distribution system that the Chinese
people seem to believe is fair.184
The system is arguably "a blue-print for individualized justice"'185
that has a tremendous potential to foster social relationships, family
ties, and alternative support structures. It emphasizes case-by-case
treatment, and encourages justice and creativity.186 As such, the
177. See id. at 97.
178. Id. at 103.
179. IL
180. Id. at 106-07.
181. In one case a court awarded a decedent's entire estate, except for some
furnishings, "to a neighbor who had looked after the decedent 'with meticulous care' for
nearly twenty years." Id. at 111.
182. Id. at 117.
183. Id.
184. Id at 117-18.
185. Id- at 117.
186. Id.
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model represents a possible solution to the systemic breakdown of
families that many societies are experiencing; it utilizes a "carrot and
stick" approach that presents educational, societal, and deterrence
stimuli to improve family behavior. However, even Foster concedes
that the system may face insurmountable hurdles.187
C. Chinese Reforms Threaten the Chinese Inheritance Model
Since 1985, China has embarked upon economic, social, and legal
reform.188 In an effort to encourage productivity, China has granted
its citizens more rights to accumulate, use, and transfer private
property.18 9  The government has also adopted testamentary
freedoms that directly undermine China's behavior-based model of
inheritance because these newly-adopted practices authorize citizens
to dispose of their property without making those dispositions
contingent upon a court's review of the beneficiaries' behavior.190 In
addition, China's attempt to dismantle state-ownership of businesses
and to privatize enterprise has simultaneously removed the sources
for funding that had, until recently, provided lifetime support
services. This has given rise to a welfare crisis that China has looked
to its inheritance system to supplant.191  Inheritance laws now
authorize courts to view the situations of elderly, minor, disabled, and
impoverished claimants as a priority when assigning inheritance
shares and actually requires the granting of mandatory shares in some
cases.1 92 Finally, China's economic reforms have spurred a need for
greater "predictability, certainty and consistency in judicial decision-
187. Id.
188. Id. at 118. "In the economic sphere, China has adopted new definitions and
protections for private property rights .... To encourage individual initiative and
productivity, the P.R.C. Government has expanded citizens' legal rights to accumulate,
use, and transfer private property, including freedom of testation." Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 119-20.
192. Id. at 120. Since 1978, China has implemented many urban, economic, labor, and
bankruptcy reforms that have cut heavily into its welfare systems. To counteract some of
these cuts, the "Inheritance Law expressly authorizes courts to give priority to elderly,
minor, disabled, and impoverished estate claimants and requires that wills reserve
'mandatory shares' for heirs who are 'unable to work and [have] no source of income.' In
judicial practice, a claimant's support needs make behavior irrelevant for inheritance
purposes." Id. at 120.
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making"'9 3 which could soon require courts to abandon a "model of
flexible, individualized adjudication of inheritance disputes."'9 4
China's behavior-based model may not survive the nation's
transformation. 195 Testamentary freedom has limited application of
the behavior-based model by prohibiting both rewards for
outstanding conduct and most penalties for misconduct.196 And, in
light of the new welfare concerns, claimant behavior is becoming
irrelevant, or at least taking a back seat to need.197 These Chinese
reforms, along with the increasing complexity of inheritance cases
resulting from increased accumulation of more complex forms of
property ownership,198 steadily increasing use of litigation to resolve
disputes, 9 9 and a diminishing ability to rely on informal dispute
resolution mechanisms at the community level because of increasing
social mobility,2° have strained the behavior-based model to its
limit.201
D. Transplanting the Chinese Model
Although it has become clear that this model, in its original form,
would probably be unworkable in the United States, there may be
parts of it that we can learn from, and adopt as our own.2°2 While it
would not be practical to transplant the reward aspect of the Chinese
behavior-based model, because it flies directly in the face of
testamentary freedom, it is possible that a limited version of the
model could be integrated into the American system. This note
proposes that the philosophy underlying the Chinese behavior-based
model of inheritance that permits courts to extinguish inheritance
rights in the case of severe neglect or abuse could be openly adopted
and integrated with current American inheritance practices. This
would result in a finely-honed weapon that would be uniquely able to
address the growing elder abuse crisis in America.
193. Itd at 121.
194. Id.
195. It at 118.
196. Id.
197. Id at 119-20.
19& It at 121.
199. Id. at 123.
200. Idt
201. See id at 121.
202- See id. at 126.
January 2001]
IV. A New Breed of "Unworthy Heir": California Probate
Code Section 259
California recently passed an extraordinary law, aimed at
preventing elder abuse, which represents a radical departure from the
state's previous inheritance statutes.20 3  California Probate Code
section 259 was enacted in September of 1998 as part of Senate Bill
number 1715. It took effect on January 1, 1999.204  The statute
generally provides that a person guilty of elder abuse may not inherit,
through any inheritance scheme, from that elder's estate "any
property, damages or costs that are awarded to the decedent's estate"
from the abuser as a result of liability for the abuse.205 The most
amazing thing about this statute is its dual nature as both a departure
from previous inheritance law and an obscure and frustratingly
inadequate attempt to solve the elder abuse problem.
A. Abusers As "Unworthy Heirs"
Section 259 is a statute that creates a species of "unworthy
heir"20 6 never before seen in California2
7 or any other state.208
Section 259 labels a past abuser of an elderly or vulnerable adult as
"unworthy" to inherit certain property from the victim purely on the
basis of the prior abuse.209 Although California does have a slayer
statute,210 itself an "unworthy heir" statute, the state has never
enacted either the unworthy parent or unworthy spouse statutes that
can be found in a few other states.211 Does this sudden enactment of
a new "unworthy heir" statute portend a trend in California that will
result in the adoption of the other already accepted "unworthy heir"
statutes? Section 259 does signal a change, but a change more subtle
than the mere sudden acceptance of "unworthy heir" statutes.
203. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
204. 1998 CAL. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 935 (Deering 1998)
205. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999). For clarity, the full text of section 259 has
been included as an Appendix.
206. See supra notes 146-59, and accompanying text.
207. As far as this author can tell.
208. As far as this author can tell. I conducted an extensive search of the states' codes
and articles on the subject and was unable to find any other statutes establishing this
particular type of "unworthy heir" statute, although I was able to find some case law that
at least one state supreme court had applied a similar approach to the financial fraud of an
elder. Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1998).
209. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
210. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 1999).
211. See supra notes 146-59, and accompanying text.
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"Unworthy heir" statutes are inconsistent with American
testamentary freedoms.212 However, some states have been able to
rationalize their enactment as a counter to injustices that sometimes
arise when persons are prevented from disinheriting others as a direct
result of the limited "forced heirships" that some states have
enacted.213 Section 259 is not an "unworthy heir" statute that can be
rationalized in a way similar to unworthy spouse or unworthy parent
statutes. Perhaps if this statute were limited to penalizing abusers of
vulnerable adults who did not have the legal capacity to make
testamentary gifts, the statute could be rationalized as being akin to
the unworthy parent statutes which arise from the legal incapacity of
minor children to disinherit them.214 However, the statute is not
limited in such a manner, and many elders, even abused ones, have
the testamentary freedom to disinherit their abusers.215 Thus, the
rationale underlying this statute cannot be equated to that of the
other "unworthy heir" statutes.
B. Camouflaging Section 259 as a Slayer Statute
What then is the rationale for this statute that flies in the face of
American testamentary freedoms? The California Legislature,
intentionally or accidentally, camouflaged this statute as a mere
addendum to the California slayer statute, and therefore saw no need
to debate or even identify a rationale for it independent of the public
policies underlying that law. 216 The rationale for the statute was
described as deterring abuse of elders by "prohibiting the ability of a
person who commits abuse to benefit through probate. '217 This
tracks the language of the maxim that underlies slayer statutes-that
no one should be allowed to benefit from his evil.218 Additionally, as
the statute worked its way through the legislature, it was frequently
associated with the California slayer statute and the slayer statue was
described as the current law in the field.219 Finally, the legislature's
212. Supra notes 145-59, and accompanying text.
213. Supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
215. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
216. Supra notes 147-59.
217. California Committee analysis, July 29, 1998 Statenet, Assembly Committee on
Appropriations Bill No. SB 1715.
218. Supra note 149.
219. California Committee Analysis, August 24, 1998 Statenet Assembly Floor Bill No.
SB 1715; Assembly Committee on Judiciary Bill No. SB 1715, hearing June 23, 1998,
California Committee Analysis, June 23, 1998, Subject: Elder and Dependent Adult
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perception of the statute as bound to the slayer statute body of law is
apparent because of where it placed the new statute in the code. The
new statute was enacted as section 259 and was grouped into the same
section of the probate code as the slayer statute (California Probate
section 250) under a newly renamed Division 2, Part 7: Effect of
Homicide or Abuse of an Elder or Dependent Adult.220
C. Familiar Rationales Fail to Apply
The rationale underlying the slayer statute does not justify the
departure from testamentary freedoms that section 259 represents.
As stated in Riggs v. Palmer, the generally accepted maxim that no
one shall be permitted "to acquire property by his own crime"
justifies the enactment of slayer statutes.22 1 However, the person
deemed unworthy by section 259 would not profit by the crime even if
section 259 did not exist. Section 259 merely prohibits the abuser
from inheriting any "property, damages, or costs that are awarded to
the decedent's estate" from the abuser as a result of the abuser's
liability for the abuse.22 2 Thus, any additional funds that an abuser
would inherit as a result of the victim's death would merely constitute
a reduction in the loss experienced by the abuser as a result of the
abuse. Because an inheritance in this case, though enlarged as a
result of the award against the abuser, would be the equivalent of a
reduction in punishment served upon the abuser rather than a profit
that the abuser received as the result of the abuse, an abuser does not
acquire property as a result of his crime in the absence of section 259.
One additional point must be made to bring the unique nature of
this statute even more clearly into focus. The legislature's stated
purpose in passing this statute was to "reduce financial and other
abuse of elders and dependent adults." 223 The legislature chose to
affect that outcome by labeling abusers as "unworthy heirs" for some
purposes.224 This country has been attempting to prevent child abuse
Abuse: False Imprisonment; California Committee Analysis, Statenet, Assembly
Committee on Public Safety Bill No. SB 1715 Date of Hearing June 30, 1998
220. When Senate Assembly Bill number 1715 was enacted, the title of Part 7 was
changed from "Effect of Homicide" to "Effect of Homicide or Abuse of an Elder or
Dependent Adult."
221. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
222. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(c) (West 1999).
223. Assembly Committee on Judiciary Bill No. SB 1715, hearing June 23, 1998,
California Committee Analysis, June 23, 1998, Subject: Elder and Dependent Adult
Abuse: False Imprisonment.
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
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for decades and yet "no jurisdictions have considered denying a
parent inheritance rights based on evidence of physical or emotional
abuse."225 California has broken new ground in the fight against elder
abuse.226
D. A Rose by Any Other Name...
The question remains: what rationale justifies the enactment of
this new exception to testamentary freedom embedded in intestate
succession? The answer is that justice does. Section 259 can only be
justified in terms of justice and can only be explained by a behavior-
based approach to inheritance schemes such as the Chinese model
that Foster described. 227 This statute represents a shift in Californian
mentality-away from the rigid value-neutrality of traditional
intestate succession schemes and testamentary freedoms into a more
just, fair, and perhaps effective method of regulation.2 Section 259 is
purely a behavior-based exception to the California inheritance laws
passed to help California combat elder abuse. 229 As such, it
represents the first of its kind in California and the nationO °
V. A New Approach to Fighting Elder Abuse in America
It remains to be seen whether behavior-based exceptions to
inheritance rights can actually reduce elder abuse in America. The
number of elder abuse victims continues to increase, and the
proportion of the population at risk continues to rise despite twenty
years of traditional efforts.3 1  States have tried education,
criminalization, restraining orders, restitution, civil remedies,
mandatory reporting, and emergency interventions3 2 Yet the
problem continues to escalate
3
Justice calls out for the nation to use this tool to fight elder
abuse. Elders are uniquely vulnerable to abuse because of they face
advancing frailty, deterioration of mental capacity, and increasing
225. Foster, supra note 1, at 80.
226. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
227. Supra notes 160-87and accompanying text.
22& Id
229. Id.
230. Again, to the best of my knowledge after an exhausting search of state codes.
231. Supra notes 83-92.
232. Supra notes 39-73.
233. Supra notes 83-92.
reliance for assistance upon the families they raised.234 That people
should victimize and terrorize the elders that brought them into the
world, and nurtured and raised them, ought to be offensive and
repugnant to any civilized nation's sensibilities. That those people
ought to then receive their victims' bounty under the guise of
"presumed intent" 235 or testamentary freedom, when no one can be
sure how much intent or freedom these victims actually had, is
intolerable. And that is exactly what may be happening in 90% of the
elder abuse cases in America today.
236
Justice demands that we use statutes similar to section 259 to
fight elder abuse. Not only can these weapons punish abuse, they can
prevent abuse, encourage reconciliation of families, and facilitate the
strengthening of family bonds and private support systems.237 Finally,
since the difficulties associated with this approach can be greatly
minimized with forethought, there are few reasons to refuse to adopt
it.238
A. Behavior-Based Strategy Offers Positive Results
Behavior-based statutes aimed at fighting elder abuse present an
opportunity to broaden the arsenal of weapons in the fight against
abuse without triggering many of the objections that researchers and
experts raise against the present reliance on mandatory reporting
programs.2
39
First, behavior-based statutes would provide significant
motivation to potential heirs and beneficiaries to be vigilant about
reporting suspected abuse. As a practical matter, a decrease or
extinction of someone else's inheritance claim means that more
money becomes available to the remaining heirs and beneficiaries.
Some might say that this increased incentive to "rat out" one's
relatives would lead to a rise in false reporting. However, statutes are
already in place making such behavior illegal, 240 and even if such a
thing occurred for a while before legislatures could get control of it,
over-reporting might help states and researchers better understand
234. Supra note 26.
235. Supra notes 117-22.
236. Supra note 27.
237. Supra notes 160-87 and accompanying text.
238. Supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
239. Garfield, supra note 37, at 882.
240. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 26-3.1-102 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-409 (West
1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-09 (2000).
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the true dimensions of the elder abuse problem. If the choice is
between the administrative inconvenience of over-reporting versus
the silent victimization of the American elderly, the obvious choice is
to deal with the inconvenience.
Second, behavior-based statutes empowering courts to extinguish
inheritance rights would also encourage self-vigilance. People that
know that misconduct could cost them their inheritances would be
more motivated to react promptly to the needs of dependent family
members, invest time and energy into maintaining emotional control,
seek assistance when they feel overwhelmed, and find appropriate
outlets for frustration and anger. Additionally, the deterrence effect
of knowing that other family members might not be willing to help
cover up the abuse could be significant. Self-vigilance would
probably immediately alleviate some elder abuse.
Finally, more cases of abuse would be resolved and would be
resolved more quickly than they are today. States can only fund so
much assistance. However, the states' efforts would be buoyed
somewhat by the privatization of some of the costs of investigation
and prosecution. Heirs and beneficiaries would be more likely to
bear the cost of investigation into the care of their relatives, or
prosecution of abusers, if they knew that they could benefit in the end
by an increase in their share of the estate. Although this view
presents a somewhat cynical view about what motivates people to act
to protect others, the truth is that if money motivates some people,
we ought not to shy away from taking advantage of that motivation to
protect vulnerable victims.
B. Behavior-Based Strategy Avoids Some Familiar Pitfalls
A limited use of behavior-based statutes could be more than just
effective241 at helping strengthen family relationships and preventing
abuse. Behavior-based statutes that could extinguish inheritance
rights would have the added benefit of encouraging respectful
attitudes toward the elderly rather than promoting ageism. Although
some might argue that reporting under these statutes would still be
based on the assumption of helplessness, the reality is that judgments
about an elderly person's need of assistance would be made by family
members or close friends, rather than strangers. Those in close
contact are more familiar with the elders' situation and abilities to ask
for help.
241. Supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Although the suggested behavior-based statutes, which would
likely increase reporting, would not immediately eliminate states'
requirements forcing professionals to report suspected abuse to
government agencies, it is possible that states would be more open to
removing those requirements if more reports were being made
voluntarily. That outcome is not a very likely one, given that the
system is already in place and operating and there seems to be no
reason to eliminate such a valuable source of information. However,
the suggested statutes would only encourage family members or
potential beneficiaries to report abuse, placing no additional burdens
on the confidentiality of privileged communications.
C. Behavior-Based Strategy Raises New Questions and Concerns
The philosophy underlying behavior-based models of inheritance
is that the law operates in the role of teacher and should clearly
articulate societal expectations about the responsibilities and duties
that family members owe each other while encouraging and
rewarding compliance. 42 While the theories underlying such a model
are admirable, the practical difficulties inherent in integrating a
behavior-based approach to inheritance into existing American law
are substantial.243  First, American courts would experience
difficulties with consistency and fair application of the law because
judges' rulings would require incredible discretion.244 Second, there
are problems with the time-consuming nature of these sorts of
inquiries.2 45 Fact-finding about family relationships and dynamics can
take incredible amounts of time.2 46 Thirdly, and perhaps most
importantly, is the philosophical question of whether using
inheritance laws as both a "stick and carrot" to achieve a
particularized mode of conduct would be appropriate or even
constitutional.
The first and second difficulties could be simultaneously dealt
with by removing most of the discretionary responsibilities from
probate court judges.2 47 If the suggested statutes were developed
242. Judith Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 489,
492 (1996).
243. Supra notes 187-201, discussing the difficulties with integrating this system into
American law.
244. Monopoli, supra note 117, at 291-92.
245. Id. at 292.
246. Foster, supra note 1, at 121.
247. Monopoli, supra note 117, at 292.
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such that the only thing that probate court judges had to factor into
their determinations was whether convictions of abuse and judgments
rendering those convictions inoperable by reason of rehabilitated
relationships had taken place in some other legal body, then probate
matters would still be able to proceed with relative speed and
simplicity.248
Such an arrangement would also create the need for some other
legal body to prosecute these cases and hear petitions for relief from
convictions on the basis of rehabilitated relationships. Several
options are available. Prosecutions in the criminal courts would
probably satisfy probate judges, since the standard of proof is beyond
a reasonable doubt, but some thought would also have to be given to
the creation of a civil cause of action that would allow private citizens
to pursue prosecution so that cases that prosecutors refused to try
could be heard.
Since adult protective services programs are already mandated in
most states, they seem to be the appropriate agencies for people
seeking relief from such convictions to look to. Adult protective
services are probably the legal agencies most qualified to conduct
investigations into the rehabilitation of relationships and the
termination of abuse.
The third difficulty is more complicated. Inheritance rights are
not constitutionally guaranteed. 249  Thus, within limits, state
governments may restrict those rights to achieve legitimate goals
without violating the Constitution.250 Ought we to do it though? Is it
appropriate to use a stick to enforce social norms? The answer
should be a resounding yes. Criminal laws are all sticks that are used
to enforce social norms. Most states already criminalize elder
abuse;zs5 they simply need bigger sticks to be able to curb it.2
Testamentary freedom and the value-neutrality of American intestate
success schemes are traditional, but not immutable characteristics that
we must maintain.253 Rigid adherence to tradition is not a valid
reason to refuse to alter the American game plan to one that makes it
easier to fight the evils of elder abuse.
248. IM.
249. Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ohio C.P. 1974).
250. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,717 (1987).
251. Garfield, supra note 37, at 869-70.
252. Supra note 38.
253. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 828.
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D. A First Step That Demands More Open and Aggressive Moves
California Probate Code section 259 is a step towards a better
inheritance model that incorporates behavior-based statutes
empowering courts to extinguish inheritance rights in limited
situations. However, the step is a small one.254 Section 259 only
actually prohibits abusers from inheriting funds that they caused to be
added to the estate of the decedent as a result of the abuse.255 In the
event of an insolvent abuser that could not pay the judgment, section
259 would provide no deterrence. However, even for someone that
could afford to pay the judgment, the size of the judgment might be
insignificant or non-existent depending on whether the elder was able
to retain an attorney, to survive litigation, or prove the case.
25 6
The stated goal of this statute was to reduce abuse of elders and
dependent adults through deterrence. But this statute is simply
inadequate to accomplish that goal257 because the prohibition against
inheriting money back that a person paid out for abuse is simply an
insufficient deterrent.
Section 259's ability to accomplish the goals of the legislature will
depend upon two things. First, this statute's nature as a behavior-
based statute for the extinction of inheritance rights needs to be
examined and openly acknowledged so that the legislature can make
a conscious policy choice about whether to push open wide the door
that has been left ajar. If the legislature can accept the value of
integrating some behavior-based strategies into American inheritance
systems, then we have a fighting chance to make real use of this tool.
Secondly, the success of section 259 will depend upon the
legislature's willingness to strengthen its provisions so that abusers
forfeit all rights to inherit all property from their victims (unless a
finding of rehabilitation has been made), to enact whatever
supporting provisions are necessary to direct the court how to deal
with the change, and to endow adult protective services with the
authority and funds to investigate and review applications for findings
of rehabilitation.
The success of section 259, and its progeny, could well spur other
jurisdictions to follow suit and sway the tide in the elder abuse crisis.
California is the first state to come this close to utilizing the powerful
254. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
255. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
256. Supra notes 51-73 on barriers to litigation.
257. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1999).
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behavior-based inheritance model. It is our right and our
responsibility to test the theories to see if we can reap some benefit
from this approach. But if we fail to do this, this unexpected
opportunity to change the path we tread will quietly evaporate.
Tradition will reassert itself, value-neutrality will rule, and millions of
helpless and abused elderly Americans will continue to bear the
burden of this shame on their frail shoulders.
Appendix:
CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2000)
Restrictions on receipt of certain estate property and on service as fiduciary by person
liable for abuse of elder or dependent adult decedent
(a) Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent to the extent
provided in subdivision (c) where all of the following apply:
(1) It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the person is
liable for physical abuse, neglect, or fiduciary abuse of the decedent, who
was an elder or dependent adult.
(2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith.
(3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive, fraudulent,
or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon the decedent.
(4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter until the
time of his or her death, has been found to have been substantially unable to
manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence.
(b) Any person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent to the extent
provided in subdivision (c) if that person has been convicted of a violation of
Section 236 of the Penal Code or any offense described in Section 368 of the
Penal Code.
(c) Any person found liable under subdivision (a) or convicted under
subdivision (b) shall not
(1) receive any property, damages, or costs that are awarded to the
decedent's estate in an action described in subdivision (a) or (b), whether
that person's entitlement is under a will, a trust, or the laws of intestacy; or
(2) serve as a fiduciary as defined in Section 39, if the instrument nominating
or appointing that person was executed during the period when the decedent
was substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or resist
fraud or undue influence.
This section shall not apply to a decedent who, at any time following the act or
acts described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), or the act or acts described in
subdivision (b), was substantially able to manage his or her financial resources
and to resist fraud or undue influence within the meaning of subdivision (b) of
Section 1801 of the Probate Code and subdivision (b) of Section 39 of the Civil
Code.
(d) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) Physical abuse as defined in Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(2) Neglect as defined in Section 15610.57 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
(3) False imprisonment as defined in Section 368 of the Penal Code.
(4) Fiduciary abuse as defined in Section 15610.30 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the severance and
transfer of an action or proceeding to a separate civil action pursuant to Section
801.
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